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The aim of this paper is to explore the use of aircraft leasing as a financing 
instrument in the low-cost carriers’ sector. These airlines have been showing a 
huge growth in the customers’ preferences, while aircraft leasing plays a 
relevant role in the financing options of airlines. In this study we determined 
that lease future commitments represent on average 80% of other debt 
commitments in low-cost carriers. Furthermore, we discovered that the leasing 
rate in low-cost airlines (49%) is superior to the global average (39%), partly 
explained by the lower capital requirements that a lease offers comparing to a 
purchase. We found a high negative correlation between average fleet age and 
use of leasing. The reason is that leases allow the airlines to renew the fleet 
more easily and get younger aircraft (in fact, 67% of the leased aircraft are 
newly-manufactured, something unlikely to happen with purchases). Negative 
correlations were also found between use of leasing and the variables of fleet 
size, on-time performance, profit margin and debt ratio, but without statistical 
evidence. Use of leasing is best explained by average fleet age and fleet size, 
meaning that variables related to the constitution of the fleet are better in 
explaining the use of leasing by low-cost carriers than performance or 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to explore the topic of aircraft leasing in low-
cost carriers, hereafter referred to as LCC. Leasing embodies the alternative 
that airlines have to the typical aircraft purchasing option. Decisions 
concerning aircraft asset management are within the most crucial ones that 
airlines need to make, representing a huge relevance in the definition of their 
strategy. 
Aircraft leasing has become an important tool for the airline industry. 
There are several reasons that explain airlines’ preference for this alternative 
source of financing. Firstly, lease gives them a higher flexibility to adapt the 
fleet to market demand. To have the possibility of changing size and 
composition of the fleet is something that attracts airlines and the more owned 
airplanes they have the harder this becomes. Secondly, leases allow airline 
companies to save money that otherwise would need to be invested in the 
acquisition of airplanes. This is particularly relevant, as a purchase demands 
high capital requirements that LCCs cannot afford. Thirdly, because this kind 
of leasing is an asset based financing, the airlines are able to generate cash 
flows from the business operations and asset exploitation (asset turnover), 
allowing them to afford the lease payments. These are three important benefits 
that lease offers, but more are going to be explored throughout the paper. 
With all these advantages it is not hard to understand why aircraft 
leasing penetration rate is nowadays 39% (according to Ascend, a leading 
provider of expert advisory and valuations services to the global aviation 
industry), meaning that, on average, airlines fully own 61% of their fleet. 
However, the same source reveals that the leasing rate has never been this 
high. For example, back to the early 1980s only 2% of the global fleet was 
leased. 
The air transport has been evolving and its numbers show a remarkable 
evolution. (See Appendix I) World’s revenue passenger-kilometers (RPK) have 
exponentially grown since 1950. For flying to become a more regular activity a 
whole set of historical developments in the airline industry had to happen.  
Liberalization of air transport and signing of multilateral agreements 




the development of air transport. The airline deregulation began in the U.S. in 
1978, with the Airline Deregulation Act, and spread across other regions of the 
world. In 1993 the European aviation market was deregulated and more 
recently, in 2009, ten members of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations) approved a multilateral open sky agreement. 
As a goal of liberalization there were no more restrictions for founding 
companies, the airlines were free to establish new routes and free pricing. The 
recently-founded LCCs adopted the point-to-point system and started their 
operation with a unique business model (Cento, 2009). The liberalized market 
allowed LCCs to pick up the price-sensitive market share offering cheaper 
tickets (Pels, 2008). Therefore these deregulations encouraged the creation of 
new carriers, particularly those following a low cost strategy. 
The LCC concept was pioneered by Pacific South West and copied in 
1973 by Southwest Airlines, becoming this way the oldest LCC still in activity 
and consequently a business model followed by dozens of new airlines. In 
1995, the LCC concept arrived to Europe with the adoption of that model by 
Ryanair (Decker, 2004). 
With the generalization of flying, more and more passengers prefer LCCs 
over others in order to save considerable amounts of money. Flying low-cost is 
not restricted to the leisure sector, since even businessmen are targeted 
(Mason, 2001). It is in this context that LCCs are playing a growing influence 
in the airline industry. 
As we will see later, Southwest Airlines, Ryanair, JetBlue Airways, 
easyJet and Gol lead the ranking of the most successful LCCs. Together with 
other big LCCs, they are nowadays crucial in the airline industry, and their 
success indicates that customers seem to be happy with their existence. For 
instance, the leaders of both domestic and international travels by number of 
passengers are LCCs. 
In that sense, this paper deals with a current hot topic and is surely 
relevant as part of the study of this phenomenon of success which are the 
LCCs. The paper will let us understand what strategies are being taken by 




Further, the use of aircraft leasing throughout the 125 existing LCCs 
will be analyzed. We will observe which variables show higher correlation with 
use of leasing and which ones explain it more accurately. Variables such as 
fleet size, average fleet age, on-time performance, profit margin and debt ratio 
will be analyzed. Comparisons with full service carriers (FSC) industry will be 
made throughout the paper.  
The upcoming section is destined to literature review on the important 
topics to this paper. Here, concepts will be explored and the hypotheses for 
our research will be shown. Methodologies and ways of conducting the 
research are describing in the following section. Afterwards, chapter 4 is where 
the results on the research topic will be displayed, together with an analysis 
on them. This section also includes an overview as well as forecasts for the 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
2.1. Low-cost carriers’ features 
Sometimes common knowledge misunderstands the concept of LCC, 
connecting an airline that offers cheap flights to an LCC. This point of view is 
only one-sided thus it is important to explore the whole concept. 
Gábor (2010) provides a thorough description of the LCC concept. The 
LCC is defined as an airline designed to have a competitive advantage in terms 
of costs over the FSC. An LCC relies on a simple firm organization and logistic 
principles. In contrast to traditional carriers, LCCs offer connections from 
secondary airports, i.e., smaller airports which are less expensive in terms of 
landing tax and handling fee. In addition, LCCs avoid airport congestion, 
which causes costly delays at hubs. By choosing secondary airports, LCCs can 
achieve fast turnarounds (20-30 minutes) and pay less for leasing airport 
facilities. Low airport lease rates and gate costs also contribute to the lower 
cost structure of LCCs. The fleet generally includes one type of aircraft that 
operates more hours a day comparing to FSCs in order to maximize the 
utilization on a daily basis. Furthermore, the LCC product is much less 
differentiated (extra services, when available, are charged) and distribution is 
as simple as possible, by making use of electronic tickets and Internet direct 
sales. This option was something impossible in the past, so Internet 
represented a catalyst for the spread of LCCs. The lower cost structure can be 
quantified by aggregating the cost savings of point-to-point networks, savings 
from not providing numerous add-on services and wage savings (LCCs have 
less employees per ASK - Available Seat Kilometer - and these have lower 
wages).  
Dobruszkes (2006) gives a summary about how LCCs operate. These 
companies have the strategy to increase output and productivity. Besides the 
lower costs stated above, LCCs achieve density economies by maximizing 
flying time. In 2004, Ryanair, easyJet or Norwegian airplanes have flown 11 
hours/day on average, against 9.2 for British Airways or 7.7 for Brussels 
Airlines. Also, LCCs show better occupation rates: the low prices ensure good 
load factors to the airlines which make the most of a demand-adapted 




revenues: LCCs have set up reservation centers via Premium Rate Services 
from which the airlines profit. They offer direct or indirect services such as car 
rentals or hotel reservation. Finally, they rent advertising possibilities on 
board or on Internet sites. 
Doganis (2006), after deducting all the cost reductions that an LCC 
achieves relatively to an FSC, estimated that unit costs for LCCs are 51% 
below that of FSCs. Higher seating density clearly represents the most relevant 
of all the cost advantages that LCCs possess. (See Appendix II) 
Trubbach (2013) studied that leading LCCs with enough funds to cover 
the acquisition costs of newly built aircraft mostly are using their aircraft for a 
few years before selling them again given they originally got major discounts 
by the manufacturers. This allows them to operate at the lowest possible 
operating costs. Most LCCs do not have the financial resources though and 
are often not yet able to execute a similar fleet strategy when they start-up. 
They have to buy or lease second-hand aircraft. This obviously generally leads 
to higher operation costs compared with carriers with brand-new fleets. In 
some exceptional circumstances, airlines with older fleets can operate more 
efficiently than those with newer fleets because of average sector lengths and 
fleet utilization. But these carriers often are more hybrid and leisure carrier 
than LCCs. As the LCC sector continues to grow, smaller carriers with older 
fleets will be at a disadvantage. The competition, which gets tougher and 
tougher each year, will squeeze smaller carriers out of the markets. According 
to the author, large LCCs like Ryanair will dominate the market, which in 
addition to their cost savings in aircraft costs also have other cost advantages 
(larger and unique fleet allows lower training and maintenance costs as well as 
purchasing aircraft in bulk). Still it will be no death warrant to be a small 
carrier, but the times where the world had many small LCCs are definitely 
over, in the author’s opinion. 
Recently, with the economic crisis, Vidovic, Štimac, and Vince (2013) 
studied whether LCCs changed their business model, becoming hybrid 
carriers and concluded that these airlines started moving towards that 
direction. They started offering seat reservation, audio and video 
entertainment, loyalty programs or transfer flights, among others. Other 




introduction of long-haul flights or cooperation with travel agencies also help 
support this argument. In addition, the study considers that differences 
between original LCCs and FSCs will become smaller and smaller. 
A survey by Sarker, Hossan, and Zaman (2012) found out that industry 
specialists and consumers both believe that LCCs have benefited the industry 
by providing low fares and made air travel affordable. Industry specialists 
believe therefore that LCCs should revolve around the LCC basic model rather 
than transforming into FSC. The research also recommends that LCCs should 
formulate cost differentiation strategy for future growth and sustainability as 
well as identifying new sources of ancillary revenue or setting up innovative 
student promotional offers for student customers as they extensively use LCCs 
owing to their budget control issues. 
2.2. Low-cost carriers’ performance 
Air transport has always been considered as a very special sector in the 
international context.  It has been a dominant factor in the process of 
globalization. Market deregulation and open skies agreement contributed for 
its growth. In particular, deregulation nurtured the growth of LCCs in the 
domestic market (Hannon, 2009). 
CAPA Centre for Aviation displays the exact data about LCC 
penetration, measured by seat capacity. (See Appendix III) LCCs now account 
for around 26.2% of global capacity. In 2001 the penetration was only 8% but 
a continuous growth of 227% in only 11 years’ time gave relevance to the low-
cost sector within the global airline industry. The same source also provides 
the share of LCC in different geographies. (See Appendix IV) It is observable 
two different types of influence of LCCs. In West Europe, South-East Asia, 
Latin America and North America, the influence is high (30% to 38%), while in 
Africa, Middle East, North-East Asia and East Europe, the influence is low (3% 
to 12%). Consequently there are plenty of opportunities for LCCs to grow their 
influence in the last group. On the other hand, West Europe represents the 
biggest increase since 2001 and is now the region with the highest share. 
Now we will look at the biggest LCCs and observe their capacity growth 
between 2011 and 2012. In order to measure the size of the airlines Available 




ASK = Available seats x Kilometers flown by the seat 
The ranking provided by CAPA Centre for Aviation (source: Innovata) 
determines the 25 biggest LCCs in terms of ASK. (See Appendix V) On the top 
of the table comes the reference airline of the sector, Southwest Airlines, 
which remains comfortable in the lead of the ranking with 1.8 billion ASK 
ahead of their pursuer, the Irish-based airline Ryanair. Southwest Airlines 
accounted for an annual growth of 7.3% in 2012, while Ryanair shows a 
similar, but negative change. The latter sees its position threatened by both 
JetBlue Airways and easyJet that show a slight increase and come in third 
and fourth places respectively. The Brazilian airline GOL saw its capacity 
decrease 9.3%, but still enough to retain the fifth position. The two following 
places are occupied by two LCC that showed relevant progresses on their ASK: 
the Indonesian Lion Air and the Australian-based Jetstar, overtaking AirTran 
Airways and Westjet. Other annual growths above 10% come a bit from 
everywhere: United States, Mexico, India, Malaysia, United Arab Emirates, 
Spain and Norway. 
Even though the top-25 LCCs achieved a relevant ASK growth of 5.9% 
last year, the truth is that the low-cost sector decreased 0.3%. These figures 
show the existing disparity within LCCs, where bigger carriers are doing well 
in general (from the top-25 only 6 showed negative annual change), while 
smaller carriers seem to be struggling. Therefore smaller carriers are pulling 
the LCCs’ performance downwards, especially when we compare to the average 
growth from all the aviation industry (3.6%). 
Furthermore, only 8 LCCs perform amongst the world’s top-50 airlines, 
measured by ASK, and only 2 amongst the top-25. This shows that, despite of 
the several advancements done in the low-cost sector, the airline industry still 
offers good opportunities for LCCs to grow and to steal customers from FSCs. 
As LCCs operate generally operate short-haul flights, it is important to 
take a look at another ranking, this time measured by number of passengers 
carried. (See Appendix VI) Here, LCCs occupy the leading positions in both 
domestic and international travel: Southwest for domestic flights and Ryanair 
for international flights, the American LCC being the overall leader with more 
than 110 million passengers carried during 2012. These rankings demonstrate 




is not homogeneous concerning success, there are a few airlines doing very 
well. 
Finally, Hüschelrath and Müller (2011) found that FSCs and LCCs each 
entered about 1,200 non-stop routes between 1996 and 2009. While entry 
activity of FSCs was much more pronounced between 1996 and 2003, LCCs 
have entered more markets per year since 2004. On the other hand, exit 
activity is much more pronounced for FSCs with in sum about 2,250 route 
exits, compared to only 391 exits on the side of the LCCs. 
2.3. Operating and finance lease 
International Accounting Standard (IAS) 17 dating from 2010 states 
that “a lease is an agreement whereby the lessor conveys to the lessee, in 
return for a payment or series of payments, the right to use an asset for an 
agreed period of time”. Leasing agreements can be divided into two major 
categories, finance leases and operating leases. Finance lease is defined by the 
IAS 17 as “a lease that transfers substantially all the risks and rewards 
incidental to ownership of an asset. Title may or may not eventually be 
transferred”. Ownership risks and costs include accountability for loss, wear 
and tear, and obsolescence, whereas ownership benefits encompasses the 
right of use, gains from asset value appreciation and possession of the 
property title. On the contrary, as lessors retain ownership, operating leases 
separate the legal ownership of an asset from its economic use and so the 
asset is an inherent form of collateral in that type of contracts (Graham, 
Lemmon, and Schallheim, 1998; Sharpe and Nguyen, 1995). 
There is another important difference between these two types of 
leasing, which is the fact that operating lease is not capitalized by the lessee, 
meaning that it does not appear on the balance sheet of the companies, i.e., 
off-balance sheet financing (though the finance obligations associated 
continue to be present). For this reason, and according to Gritta, Lippman, 
and Chow (1994), between 1969 and 1991 the percentage of operating leases 
in total leases in the US increased from 13% to 82%. Other benefits such as 






2.4. Leasing as debt substitute or complement 
Hypothesis 1: Leasing is negatively correlated with debt ratio 
The relationship between lease and debt has generated a lot of 
discussion. Many authors go against the traditional finance theory and raised 
the argument that leases complement debt, which is the case of Eisfeldt and 
Rampini (2009) who proved that, due to the ability to repossess the asset, the 
debt capacity of leasing is higher than the capacity of security lending. 
Likewise, Lewis and Schallheim (1992) show that leasing can increase a 
firm's debt capacity by selling excess non-debt tax shields. They conclude that 
leasing and borrowing can be complementary within the firm's optimal capital 
structure. 
Consistent with these predictions, Ang and Peterson (1984) find leasing 
to be positively related to the firm's debt ratio: lessee firms used more long-
term debt than did non-leasing firms. 
Yan (2006) presents a model to incorporate different theories on the 
substitutability and complementarity between leases and debt. The findings 
suggest that leases and debt are substitutes instead of complements. The 
paper also investigates the variation in the substitutability between leases and 
debt, and finds that in those firms with more growth options or larger 
marginal tax rates, or in those firms paying no dividends, the substitutability 
is more pronounced, i.e., the cost of new debt increases to a larger degree with 
extra leases. 
Oum, Zhang, and Zhang (2000) concluded that the debt capacity of the 
firm is not increased by operating leases, thus in such cases debt and leasing 
seem to be substitutes. Marston and Harris (1988) also found empirical 
evidence of substitutability between leases and debt by focusing on changes in 
lease ratios rather than on levels. Results from Deloof, Lagaert, and 
Verschueren (2007) too provide strong support for the substitution hypothesis: 
more debt is associated with fewer leases. 
Beattie, Goodacre, and Thomson (2000) determined that leasing and 




of non-lease debt, on average, consistent with the argument that lessors bear 
some risks which are not inherent in debt contracts. 
Erickson and Trevino (1994), this time through an exclusive analysis of 
the airline industry, achieved results indicating that leasing is significantly 
and negatively related to the current debt to asset ratio. In other words, leases 
and debt are substitutes. 
It is difficult to decide for one of the sides since both arguments seem 
reasonable but one aspect is true for any case: as operating lease hides future 
obligations, companies present lower leverage ratios, which usually leads to an 
increase in the share price. The traditional finance theory and the last paper 
(since it studied about the airline sector) were taken into account. This way, 
we are going to test the hypothesis of substitutability between leasing and 
debt. According to the literature, we are going to observe the effect of leasing 
on the debt ratio of an airline. 
2.5. Aircraft leasing 
Regarding the topic of aircraft leasing, which is central in this paper, 
there is relevant literature describing its patterns. 
Gritta and Lippman (2010) give an historical perspective of the evolution 
of the aircraft leasing since 1960s. Back then, many carriers employed finance 
lease as an alternative source of funds to acquire aircraft. It had a major 
advantage over purchasing the aircraft, since it was off-balance sheet 
financing: the obligations under this type of lease appeared only in the 
footnotes to carrier balance sheets. Little use was made of short-term lease 
agreements during this period. The situation has changed radically over the 
past three decades. Since 1976 finance lease are required to be reported as 
both a leasehold asset and a long-term liability. In response, the carriers 
substantially altered the way they finance airplanes. Airlines began to use 
more shorter-term operating leases, which are not reported on companies’ 
balance sheets. By strategically violating the criteria for capital leases, the 
airlines once again pushed the leases off the balance sheet. 
Mancilla (2010) reviews aircraft asset management strategies and 
programs implemented by airlines in today’s difficult business environment. 




account as part of the airline strategy and management decisions, notably 
during downturns. Indeed, empirical data suggests that airlines changed their 
approach during the recent economic crisis. The author found a decrease in 
demand for leased aircraft which supports the idea that operating leases are a 
key management tool during market downturn because it permits airlines to 
decrease capacity without bearing the aircraft asset value risk. This decrease 
was more notorious in the most affected regions by economic crisis such as 
Europe and North America. Conversely, in emerging markets such as Asia 
Pacific (notably China) and Latin America airlines fleet grew and the number of 
aircraft under operating lease either increased or did not change. 
Oum, Zhang, and Zhang (2000) performed a study about the optimal 
demand for operating lease of aircraft, an instrument which gives the airlines 
flexibility in capacity management. However, airlines pay a risk premium to 
the leasing companies for bearing part of the risks. Thus, the airlines face a 
trade-off between flexibility of capacity and higher costs. This paper develops a 
model for the airlines to determine their optimal mix of leased and owned 
capacity, taking into consideration that the demand for air transportation is 
uncertain and cyclical. Empirical results based on the model suggested that 
the optimal demand by 23 major airlines in the world would range between 
40% and 60% of their total fleet, for the reasonable range of premiums of 
operating lease. For leasing companies, this indicates huge potential of the 
market given strong forecast for the growth of air transportation in the next 
decade. 
Clark (2007) explains a relevant advantage of aircraft lease against a 
loan. Under a loan structure the repayments are made with constant principal 
and declining interest, whereas under a lease structure the repayments are of 
a mortgage style, with constant payments. The disadvantage of the loan 
structure is that it places a burden on the airline cash flow in the early years, 
thus the constant payment stream of the lease structure is often the preferred 
option. 
Gavazza (2010) empirically analyzed how the liquidity of the asset - in 
this case, aircraft - affects whether or not carriers lease the aircraft they 
operate, the optimal maturity of lease contracts and the markups of lease 




more likely to be leased, particularly through operating leases; have shorter 
operating leases; have longer capital leases; and command lower markups of 
operating lease rates. 
In a different paper, Gavazza (2010) constructed a dynamic model of 
transactions in used capital to understand the role of leasing when trading is 
subject to frictions. The model determined that leased assets trade more 
frequently and produce more output than owned assets, for two reasons. First, 
high-volatility firms are more likely to lease than low-volatility firms, since 
they expect to adjust their capacity more frequently. Second, ownership’s 
larger transaction costs widen owners’ inaction bands relative to lessees’. The 
author also found that leased aircraft have holding durations 38% shorter and 
fly 6.5% more hours than owned aircraft. 
Gilligan (2004) found an inverse relationship between depreciation and 
trading volume for less reliable brands of used business aircraft. Conversely, 
the author found an increase in the direct relationship between depreciation 
and trading volume for aircraft models with relatively high lease rates. 
Together these findings suggest that adverse selection is a prominent feature 
of the market for contemporary used business aircraft and that leasing 
mitigates the consequences of asymmetric information about the quality of 
used durable goods. 
Hypothesis 2: Leasing is negatively correlated with fleet size 
Erickson and Trevino (1994) used the airline industry in order to 
examine what determines the importance of leasing in a company. The paper 
found that operating leases are used by smaller firms, non-tax paying firms 
and firms experiencing more rapid sales growth. 
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) came to the conclusion that the fraction of 
capital that firms lease is significantly related to firm size, decreasing from 
46% for small firms to 11% for large firms. 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) also found that the use of operating leases is 
negatively related to firm size, since firm size is likely correlated with financial, 
but also other, factors that influence the lease-versus-buy decision. The 
authors, who took turnover as measure of size, claimed that more asymmetric 




do larger firms. Resulting in asset substitution problem for smaller firms more 
than larger firms and ultimately tends the smaller firms to lease more assets. 
Adams and Hardwick (1998) further added that smaller firms may use 
certain assets only partially and may find these assets un-useful in future and 
therefore leasing could compensate the acquiring and disposing costs of those 
assets for smaller firms. Investigation explored a controversial relationship of 
leasing and size of firm as a deterministic variable. 
Lasfer and Levis (1998) too reported a negative relationship between 
firm size and leasing while suggesting that smaller firms are much more in 
need for leasing than do larger firms. 
All these papers head towards the same direction, leading us to test a 
negative correlation between use of leasing and airline size, measured by total 
fleet. In our tests it is going to be determined how the size of the airline affects 
its use of leasing. 
Hypothesis 3: Leasing is negatively correlated with average fleet age 
Gilligan (2004) analyzed the relationship between leasing percentage 
and age of aircraft and observed that the leasing percentage is fairly constant 
in the data over the age of aircraft. 
Later on, Gavazza (2010) empirically showed that leased aircraft are, on 
average, about 1.5 years younger than owned aircraft. 
This way, it is going to be tested whether airlines with older fleets own a 
bigger proportion of their aircraft than airlines with younger fleet. The 
rationale is that leasing activity is more pronounced in young aircraft, i.e., the 
decision between owning or leasing an airplane is explained by its age. We 
hypothesize that airlines with older aircraft either own them for a long time, 
without being active in the leasing market recently, or purchase old, second-
hand aircraft at much lower rates. On the other hand, airlines with younger 
fleet are thought to be more active concerning aircraft replacements, thus 




2.6. Financial performance 
A good financial performance is sought by every airline. Although this 
industry does not historically give the highest returns, this is always the goal 
of a company, and aircraft leasing should be adjusted in order to meet that 
target. Below some literature is presented concerning airlines’ financial 
performance. 
Feng and Wang (2000) show the importance of using financial ratios to 
make a complete, unbiased performance evaluation of an airline. The study 
divided total performance into three major departments of an airline: 
production, marketing and management. The conclusions revealed that 
transportation indicators are more suitable to measure the production 
efficiency than financial ratios and mixed indicators, and the execution 
efficiency is best measured by financial ratios. 
Dempsey (2008) researched on financial performance of the airline 
industry post-deregulation. Since then there has been more volatility, deeper 
troughs in the market cycle, prolonged losses and widespread bankruptcies. 
Industry net profit margins averaged 2.8% before deregulation and fell to a -
0.6% under deregulation. Profitability and returns on investment have become 
both more volatile and significantly worse, since deregulation. 
Hüschelrath and Müller (2011) analyzed the differences in financial 
performance between carriers in the U.S. Between 2000 and 2009, FSCs 
realized an operating loss of $35,418 million with only two years (2000 and 
2007) displaying an operating profit. In the same time frame, LCCs earned in 
sum $8,038 million, with Southwest Airlines contributing the largest share of 
$5,570 million. Curiously, while none of the FSCs managed to realize a net 
operating profit in the period from 2000 to 2009, all LCCs can report such a 
net operating profit. 
Hypothesis 4: Leasing is negatively correlated with profit margin 
Ang and Peterson (1984), besides finding that leases and debt are 
complements, concluded that profitability is a significant negative explanatory 
factor for the level of leasing. This result is consistent with Kare and Herbst’s 
(1990) survey evidence that more profitable firms, having easier access to low 




Likewise, empirical findings from Deloof, Lagaert, and Verschueren 
(2007) indicate that leasing is negatively correlated with profitability: firms 
with low profits and high growth need more external financing and will 
therefore have higher fixed-claim financing. 
Within airline industry, Erickson and Trevino (1994) expected there 
would be negative correlation. The authors criticized that previous leasing 
literature ignores the effects of profitability on leasing which results in model 
misspecification. After performing the tests, lease ratios were found to be 
statistically unrelated to profitability. 
Gritta and Lynagh (1973) show that airline companies that experience 
financial difficulties are the ones that show higher rates of aircraft leasing. For 
these companies, the paper suggests that leasing may be the solution today 
but it also may be tomorrow’s problem. Airlines appear to be damaging their 
financial structure, by carrying long-term obligations of leasing arrangements 
which accounting authorizes to hide. 
Taking these papers into account, we will confirm if less profitable 
airlines show higher indices of aircraft leasing, or in other words, if 
profitability explains use of leasing. 
2.7. Service quality 
Another aspect that this paper covers is the service quality provided by 
airlines. There is some interesting literature regarding this topic, which is 
extremely important for the airlines’ success. 
There are many models to evaluate service quality, being SERVQUAL 
one of the most used. This model has five main dimensions to measure service 
quality: tangibles, reliability, responsiveness, assurance, and empathy 
(Zeithaml, Berry, and Parasuraman, 1996). Many scholars have created other 
measures with various quality dimensions. Gourdin (1988) categorized airline 
service quality in terms of three items: safety, timelines and price. Truitt and 
Haynes (1994) used the processing of luggage, seat cleanliness, and the check-
in process, the convenience of transit, timeliness, and handling of customer 




Regardless of which model to use, Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 
(1988) showed that customer satisfaction with a service can be defined by 
comparing perception of service received with expectations of service desired. 
This can be particularly helpful to LCCs due to possible lower expectations of 
customers on them. 
Bowen and Headley (2013) claim on-time performance to be the greatest 
determinant of service quality. For them this criterion is the most important 
followed by denied boarding, mishandled baggage and customer complaints. 
The report analyzed 14 U.S. airlines, and last year‘s top-3 is remarkably 
constituted only by LCCs, proving the idea that LCCs manage to outperform 
the traditional carriers in terms of service quality. The study also concluded 
that the industry performance for all four measurements improved 
substantially in 2008 and 2009, remaining stable since then. 
Bhat (1995) considers that on-time performance is of significant 
concern to an airline traveler. The author did a multivariate analysis of airline 
flight delays and detected that the likelihood of a flight being delayed increases 
with airline size and operating revenue per employee, with statistical 
significance. The fact that this kind of airlines operates in congested airports 
seem to explain these findings. However, this is not an issue that LCCs face as 
they avoid such hubs. 
Kim and Lee (2011) studied the Korean domestic LCC market and 
achieved results indicating that the significant dimensions of customer 
satisfaction are tangibles, defined as the physical facilities of the aircraft, and 
responsiveness, related to the willingness to help passengers solve service 
problems. In addition, the study confirms the significant consequences of 
customer satisfaction including word-of-mouth communication, purchase 
intentions, and complaining behavior. On-time performance was found to be 
an important factor for LCCs’ customer satisfaction. It ranked fifth (after 
employee appearance, accuracy, helpfulness and courteousness), among 17 
different factors. 
Mazzeo (2003) provided another interesting analysis on service quality 
in U.S. airline industry, particularly its relation with competition. The author 




significantly greater on routes where only one airline provides direct service, 
thus additional competition brings better on-time performance. 
Hypothesis 5: Leasing is negatively correlated with on-time performance 
From the existing literature we conclude that on-time performance is a 
key measure to determine an airline service quality. It was not found any 
literature trying to relate the use of leasing with service quality, perhaps 
because these variables do not directly influence each other. Although we are 
going to test this correlation, we understand that it could be spurious since, in 
between leasing and service quality, profitability can be playing the 
determinant role. Continuous investment in service quality, which is not 
always cost-related, may result not only in direct improvements in service 
quality but also increase the company’s profits through a competitive 
advantage (Reichheld and Sasser, 1990). This way, in our calculations we will 
test if airlines that provide better service quality show higher profitability 
levels, and consequently (according to hypothesis 4) make less use of leasing. 
This way we hypothesize that leasing shows a negative correlation with service 





CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents a detailed description of the methods used to 
gauge the main research question in the present study. 
3.1. The industry 
We will start by discussing the identification process of the LCCs. 
Although we use the LCC expression for a homogenous category researches 
verify that there is no consistent low-cost strategy (Pels, 2008). The business 
strategies used by LCCs differ from each other in what condition they were 
formed (Francis et al., 2006). 
Due to this, several variations of business models were set up inside the 
low-cost category. Five ways of developing the low-cost business model were 
identified (Francis et al., 2006):  
 Southwest Airlines copy-cats  
This category consists of the airlines that were founded from scratch by 
independent entrepreneurs. These carriers stand closest to the Southwest 
model (Ryanair, easyJet).  
 Subsidiaries  
Typically those LCCs presenting this category, which are subsidiaries of 
national carriers, and they were established to gain market share from the 
already existing LCCs (Iberia with Iberia Express; Qantas with Jetstar 
Airways).  
 Diversified charter carriers  
These are low-cost subsidiaries founded by charter carriers to provide 
scheduled LCC flights (TUIfly). 
 Cost cutters  
These airlines are usually considered as hybrid carriers. The members 
of this group are such FSCs which are trying to imitate the LCCs by cutting 
the operational costs. They continue to operate to a hub-and-spoke system 
while attempting to rationalize their fleet and stop in-flight catering (Aer 
Lingus).  




Flights in this category can not be considered as real LCCs due to the 
fact that they can only maintain their low prices with state subsidy (Emirates). 
This paper only considers the pure LCCs. Therefore only airlines 
belonging to the first three business models are taken into account. Cost 
cutters are airlines that usually represent a separate business strategy that is 
neither FSC nor LCC. These airlines are normally identified as the new hybrid 
carriers. In addition, some LCCs are also becoming hybrid carriers, as 
mentioned by Vidovic, Štimac, and Vince (2013). For that reason it was hard 
to determine whether an airline is a LCC or a hybrid career since the border 
between each model is very thin and there are many airlines having features 
from more than one. 
After researching about the features of the airlines one by one, we came 
to a final list of LCCs, displayed in Table 1. According to our definition, as of 
October 31st, 2013 there are a total of 125 LCCs in the world. 
Another issue that demanded detailed research was the fact that 
mergers, acquisitions, discontinuations and bankruptcies are a constant in 
the airline industry. Between 2007 and 2012, 136 airlines ceased operations 
and the industry witnessed three major airline bankruptcies and re-
organizations with Japan Airlines, AMR and Kingfisher (Allen, 2013). It is 
likely therefore that tomorrow this list is not accurate, either by the 
appearance/disappearance of an LCC or by the change on its business model. 
It is worth mentioning the reason why some airlines do not participate 
in the study. Airberlin comes in many studies, papers and databases as LCC 
or hybrid, however in its annual report, the German airline assumes a clear 
identity of FSC and for that reason will not join our study. Virgin Australia, 
after several years operating as an LCC, improved its services to become a 
(self-described) "New World Carrier": essentially a business model which offers 
the passenger the choice of purchasing a ticket with aspects of the "no frills" 
approach of LCCs or paying a little more to receive services more in line with 
FSCs. Airbrussels is an airline that operates as FSC, but started recently 
offering travels at a lower price, with fewer extras. Finally, Aer Lingus, whose 
characteristics are presented above and whose annual report clearly describes 




Table 1: List of LCCs 
Europe JetBlue Airways UNITED STATES PAL Express PHILIPPINES 
Belle Air ALBANIA Southwest Airlines UNITED STATES Philippines AirAsia PHILIPPINES 
Intersky AUSTRIA Spirit Airlines UNITED STATES Tigerair Philippines PHILIPPINES 
NIKI AUSTRIA Sun Country Airlines UNITED STATES Jetstar Asia Airways SINGAPORE 
Jetairfly BELGIUM Virgin America UNITED STATES Scoot SINGAPORE 
SmartWings CZECH REP. South America Tigerair SINGAPORE 
Flybe Finland FINLAND Amaszonas BOLIVIA Air Busan SOUTH KOREA 
Transavia France FRANCE Azul Brazilian Airlines BRAZIL Eastar Jet SOUTH KOREA 
Germanwings GERMANY GOL BRAZIL Jeju Air SOUTH KOREA 
TUIfly GERMANY PAL Airlines CHILE Jin Air SOUTH KOREA 
Astra Airlines GREECE Sky Airline CHILE T'Way Air SOUTH KOREA 
Wizz Air HUNGARY Easyfly COLOMBIA Mihin Lanka SRI LANKA 
WOW Air ICELAND VivaColombia COLOMBIA City Airways THAILAND 
Ryanair IRELAND Peruvian Airlines PERU Nok Air THAILAND 
Air One  ITALY Star Peru PERU Nok Mini THAILAND 
Belle Air Europe ITALY Asia Pacific Orient Thai Airlines THAILAND 
Blu-Express ITALY Jetstar Airways AUSTRALIA Thai AirAsia THAILAND 
Meridiana ITALY Tigerair Australia AUSTRALIA Jetstar Pacific VIETNAM 
AirBaltic LATVIA United Airways BANGLADESH VietJet Air VIETNAM 
Corendon Dutch Airlines NETHERLANDS Juneyao Airlines CHINA Middle East 
Transavia NETHERLANDS Lucky Air CHINA Arkia ISRAEL 
Norwegian Air Shuttle NORWAY Spring Airlines CHINA Israir ISRAEL 
Blue Air ROMANIA Dragonair HONG KONG Jazeera Airways KUWAIT 
Iberia Express SPAIN GoAir INDIA AirBlue PAKISTAN 
Volotea SPAIN IndiGo INDIA PIA PAKISTAN 
Vueling SPAIN JetKonnect INDIA Nas Air SAUDI ARABIA 
easyJet Switzerland SWITZERLAND SpiceJet INDIA Anadolu Jet TURKEY 
Helvetic Airways SWITZERLAND Citilink INDONESIA Corendon TURKEY 
Wizz Air Ukraine UKRAINE Indonesia AirAsia INDONESIA Onur Air TURKEY 
EasyJet UK Lion Air INDONESIA Pegasus TURKEY 
Flybe UK Tigerair Mandala INDONESIA SunExpress TURKEY 
Jet2 UK Air Do JAPAN Air Arabia UAE 
Monarch Airlines UK JAL Express JAPAN Flydubai UAE 
North America Jetstar Japan JAPAN RAK Airways UAE 
Air Transat CANADA Peach JAPAN Africa 
Sunwing Airlines CANADA Skymark Airlines JAPAN Air Arabia Egypt EGYPT 
Westjet CANADA Solaseed Air JAPAN Fly 540 KENYA 
Interjet MEXICO AirAsia MALAYSIA Air Arabia Maroc MOROCCO 
Magnicharters MEXICO AirAsia X MALAYSIA Dana Air NIGERIA 
VivaAerobus MEXICO Firefly MALAYSIA Kulula.com SOUTH AFRICA 
Volaris MEXICO Malindo Air MALAYSIA Mango SOUTH AFRICA 
AirTran Airways UNITED STATES Golden Myanmar MYANMAR Fastjet TANZANIA 
Allegiant Air UNITED STATES AirAsia Zest PHILIPPINES Nouvelair TUNISIA 





3.2. Data collection 
In order to collect the data it was used secondary research. Airlines’ 
annual reports and online databases were the means through which 
information was collected. The most important online databases were 
PlaneSpotters and FlightStats. 
All the information about the size of the fleet, age of the fleet, leased and 
owned aircraft, and on-time performance are updated as of October 31st, 2013. 
Remaining information was collected from the last available annual report of 
each airline company. 
Unfortunately for research purposes, not all the airlines released 
annual reports. This fact limited the data collection in a way that sample size 
(N) became distinct between variables. In addition, another reason why N 
varies is because several annual reports consolidate the figures from more 
than one subsidiary (e.g. Air Arabia Group owns Air Arabia, Air Arabia Maroc 
and Air Arabia Egypt). This causes that in some variables subsidiaries are 
treated separately while in others are treated together. A final limitation was 
the case of those LCCs that are subsidiaries of an FSC or of an unrelated 
entity to aviation. For some of them individual financial data is not provided, 
which again imply a variation of N. 
3.3. The measures 
According to the hypotheses created, there is one variable that is 
present in every correlation test, which is use of leasing by LCCs. A total of five 
variables will be tested against use of leasing. Below, follows an explanation on 
these variables: 
 Use of leasing 
This measure gives the percentage of leased aircraft in the total fleet, in 
other words, it is the leasing penetration rate in each airline. Here, both 
operating and finance leases are included. Mention that neither stored aircraft 
nor ordered ones count. Moreover, aircraft sub-leased to another airline only 
count in the airline that act as lessee in order to avoid duplication. The data 
was collected from PlaneSpotters in accordance to official annual reports. 




The total number of aircraft that an LCC possesses gives an accurate 
measure in order to determine the size of the airlines. To compare the size of 
the airlines this is believed to be the most adequate way of doing it, since 
airlines belong to different countries and the use of different currencies would 
raise issues when performing comparisons. Mention that neither stored 
aircraft nor ordered ones count. Moreover, aircraft sub-leased to another 
airline only count in the airline that act as lessee in order to avoid duplication. 
The data was collected from PlaneSpotters in accordance to official annual 
reports. 
 Average fleet age 
This measure defines how old an airline fleet is, on average, and is also 
comparable between companies. This is the best way to assess the modernity 
of an airline. Mention that neither stored aircraft nor ordered ones count. 
Moreover, aircraft sub-leased to another airline only count in the airline that 
act as lessee in order to avoid duplication. The data was collected from 
PlaneSpotters in accordance to official annual reports. 
 On-time performance 
It determines the historical percentage of on-time arrivals of an airline. 
Literature shows this measurement is considered relevant as for the 
assessment of an airline service quality. The data was taken from FlightStats, 
an online database which provided results for 80% of the existing LCCs. 
 Profit margin 
This financial indicator is the ratio between net income and revenues. It 
can be interpreted as the percentage of selling price that turned into profit. 
Thus profit margin is an important measure of profitability which evaluates 
the financial performance of a company. 
 Debt ratio 
The debt ratio is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, 
expressed in percentage, i.e., the proportion of a company's assets that are 
provided via debt. This is a financial measurement that assesses the financial 
health of an airline, but also assesses its risk profile. Here it was used the 




After the correlations and regressions analyses this paper includes 
other unique findings about the leasing profile of LCC. Namely: 
 Leasing penetration in LCCs and industry-wide 
This statistic measures the average aircraft leasing rate in the LCC 
sector, which will be further compared to the aviation industry average, given 
by Ascend, a leading provider of expert advisory and valuations services to the 
global aviation industry. 
 Leasing by regions 
Here the leasing penetration will be split by regions and again a 
comparison between LCCs and the global aviation industry (given by Ascend) 
is going to be done. Regions are split as follows: Europe, North America, South 
America, Asia Pacific, Middle East and Africa. 
 Proportion of newly manufactured leased aircraft 
The aim is to find out, between all the airplanes leased by LCCs, the 
percentage of them that are new at the moment they join the lessee’s fleet. The 
data was collected from PlaneSpotters in accordance to official annual reports. 
 Proportion of operating and finance leases 
According to the data available in LCCs’ annual reports (and that 
explicitly mentions how many aircraft are being leased under each category), it 
will be done a calculation in order to determine the proportion of aircraft 
under operating and finance lease. 
 Relevance of leasing commitments 
Collected from the data available in LCCs’ annual reports, this statistic 
assesses the exact relevance of financing through leasing in the airlines’ 
financial structure. A comparison will be made between future lease 
commitments and other debt commitments. Mention that the lease 
commitments refer to both operating and finance leases, including also spare 
engines and simulators leasing. The remaining debt commitments are all the 
debt obligations net of leasing. 
3.4. Data analysis 
Data analysis was done by using SPSS statistical software. Once the 




moment correlation coefficients. A table has been created, allowing us to 
understand the direction and significance of each correlation between the six 
variables in the study. Afterwards, regressions were computed in accordance 
to literature review and hypotheses development, allowing us to understand 




CHAPTER 4: RESULTS’ ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
In this chapter the statistical results related to main research question 
will be presented as well as an analysis on them. 
In our analysis six variables are included: use of leasing, fleet size, 
average fleet age, on-time performance, profit margin and debt ratio. According 
to the available information, we gathered data about LCCs for the six 
variables. (See Appendices VII and VIII) 
The use of aircraft leasing in the LCC industry is the key variable in the 
study and this chapter is entirely destined to carefully explain its 
characteristics. Also in this chapter there will be a discussion about the 
evolution, features and challenges on the aircraft leasing market. 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics, presented in Table 2, allow us to get an initial 
perception on each of the variables. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
  Use of leasing Fleet size Average fleet age On-time performance Profit margin Debt ratio 
Mean 57% 35 9.7 75% -6.2% 73.7% 
St dev 33% 64 6.4 12% 47.5% 27.1% 
Range 100% 574 28 51% 302.6% 109.2% 
Max 100% 575 28.4 93% 37.0% 141.5% 
Min 0% 1 0.4 42% -265.6% 32.4% 
N 125 125 125 100 33 30 
 
In a brief analysis of the descriptive statistics we observe that there are 
LCCs whose fleet is entirely leased and others without any leased aircraft. 
Fleet size shows a high standard deviation. Its mean is 35 aircraft and its 
maximum is an impressive number of 575 aircraft from Southwest Airlines. 
Interestingly enough, the average fleet age varies as much as 28 years in our 
population, being its mean 9.7 years. On the other hand, on-time performance 
does not vary as much within the population. Its mean is 75% and its 
maximum of 93% belongs to TUIfly and Iberia Express. Relevant is the fact 
that the average profit margin is negative (-6.2%), meaning that on average 
LCCs experience loss at the end of the year. Here the range is impressively 




Air Arabia presents the lowest and PIA the highest, with a range of 109.2% 
between both. On average, debt accounts for almost three fourths of the 
balance sheet (73.7%). 
4.2. Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficients 
In our five hypotheses there is a common variable which is the use of 
leasing in LCCs. We will test the correlation of this variable with five others: 
fleet size, average fleet age, on-time performance, profit margin and debt ratio. 
Yet all the correlations between the six variables will be displayed in order to 
make a full analysis and look for interesting results. That way, Table 3 was 
computed. 
Table 3: Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficients 
 
The correlations table demonstrates negative correlations between use 
of leasing and all the other five variables, going in the same directions of the 
hypotheses created. However, only average fleet age has a significant level of 
correlation (-0.321), with significance at the 0.01 level. Therefore, only one of 
our hypotheses was confirmed: H3. This implies that LCCs with newer fleets 
tend to make more use of leasing. On the other hand, old fleets have more 
owned aircraft, either purchased a long time ago or more recently at low 




easily, allowing them to have a younger fleet and thus improving the image 
and quality of the airline. 
Although no significance has been found in the correlation with use of 
leasing, the closest variable to that was the fleet size (-0.141), hinting that 
airlines with a bigger fleet lease fewer aircraft, which is consistent with H2, 
namely if we consider the fleet size to be a proxy for the firm size.  
We found that airlines with higher leasing penetration rates show worse 
profit margins, consistently with H4, although this correlation is very weak (-
0.032). Furthermore, airlines with higher leasing penetration rates have a 
smaller debt ratio. However, the low correlation coefficient (-0.071) does not 
allow us to statistically confirm that debt and lease are substitutes in the LCC 
sector, though the sign of the correlation is consistent with H1, as tested by 
the papers reviewed in Chapter 2. 
Another important assumption this paper verifies is that lower service 
quality explains lower profitability, which leads to higher use of leasing, even 
though we do not find statistical significance on these two correlations. The 
direct correlation between use of leasing and on-time performance is not 
significant either (-0.059), though the sign is again consistent with H5. 
Another statistically significant correlation was found between average 
fleet age and profit margin. The negative correlation proves that Trubbach 
(2013) was right when affirming that LCCs with older fleets have a clear 
disadvantage on their operating costs. 
As a general idea, aircraft leasing seems to be associated with smaller 
airlines and airlines with lower performance and quality. In addition, start-up 
carriers often prefer leases because they lower the capital costs for market 
entry. The option of leasing comes therefore as an important rescue option to 
all these airlines. Many times, they are credit-squeezed being unable to afford 
purchasing an aircraft, thus leasing embodies the chance for them to keep 
operating. 
4.3. Regressions 
After the Pearson’s correlations analysis we will proceed to the 




variable, since we aim to understand what causes its variations. This way, we 
suggest that the use of leasing by LCCs depends on the fleet size, the age of 
the fleet, quality of service (as measured by on time performance) and 
profitability of the firm. For this initial model, which can be found in Table 4, 
multicollinearity is not an issue in this case since we got relatively low 
correlations. 
Table 4: Use of leasing as explained by Fleet Size and Age, On-time 
performance and profit margin 
Dependent variable: Use of leasing N: 33     Adjusted R2: 0.039     F: 1.305 
Variable Expected causality Coefficient p-value 
(Constant)  0.997 0.022 
Fleet size (-) -0.001 0.356 
Average fleet age (-) -0.021 0.044 
On-time performance (-) -0.248 0.628 
Profit margin (-) -0.107 0.430 
 
Keep in mind, that given the data availability on profit margin, we can 
only run this regression for 33 observations. This is likely the main reason for 
the low adjusted R2, meaning that this model does not describe the profile of 
an airline in terms of leasing strategy accurately. It was fairly expected due to 
the low correlations between some variables and use of leasing found in the 
previous chapter. 
Still, the variable that showed lower p-value was average fleet age 
(0.044), meaning that it described the use of leasing fine. The reasoning is that 
older fleets have fewer leased airplanes, while younger fleets make more 
aircraft replacements through leasing. The remaining variables, while showing 
the expected negative causality too, were not significant. 
Next, due to the sample size varying so much according to the different 
variables, we are going to test limited versions of the original regression, i.e., 




Table 5: Use of leasing as explained by Fleet Size and Age, and On-time 
performance  
Dependent variable: Use of leasing N: 100     Adjusted R2: 0.120     F: 5.497 
Variable Expected causality Coefficient p-value 
(Constant)  1.005 0.000 
Fleet size (-) -0.001 0.057 
Average fleet age (-) -.0.018 0.000 
On-time performance  (-) -0.284 0.289 
 
Table 5 presents a higher N and a higher adjusted R2. In this model, 
fleet size and age as well as on-time performance confirmed the negative 
expected causality. Fleet size and age demonstrate high significance levels, 
thus small and younger fleets are likely to show higher leasing penetration 
rates.  
Table 6: Use of leasing as explained by Fleet Size and Age  
Dependent variable: Use of leasing N: 125     Adjusted R2: 0.122     F: 9.642 
Variable Expected causality Coefficient p-value 
(Constant)  0.784 0.000 
Fleet size (-) -0.001 0.031 
Average fleet age (-) -0.018 0.000 
 
By excluding on-time performance we are able to achieve the model, 
show in Table 6, with the highest possible N in our study, and a higher 
adjusted R2. Again the negative expected causality is confirmed in the 
variables of fleet age and size. Both variables give p-values under 0.05, 
meaning that they are statistical significant in explaining use of leasing by 
LCCs. 
A final regression is the one that contains debt ratio as dependent 
variable and use of leasing as independent, as it comes in Table 7. Literature 
review and hypotheses development lead us to test the substitutability 
between debt and lease, or in other words, by using leases airlines need less 




Table 7: Debt ratio as explained by Use of Leasing 
Dependent variable: Debt ratio  N: 30     Adjusted R2: -0.083     F: 0.257  
Variable Coefficient p-value 
(Constant) 0.0793 0.000 
Use of leasing -0.075 0.651 
Fleet size 0.000 0.586 
Profit Margin -0.056 0.621 
 
Use of leasing is found to make a negative contribution of debt ratio, yet 
with lack of statistical significance. Once more, explanatory power is 
potentially explained by the small N. These results suggest substitutability 
between lease and debt but we are unable to confirm this hypothesis. Notice 
we are limiting ourselves to a small set of three independent variables, 
because of data availability.1  
Regression results go according with those from Pearson’s correlation 
section, which showed that the two strongest explaining variables of use of 
leasing are fleet size and average fleet age, with the latter demonstrating 
higher significance. From the multiple regression analysis we are able to 
conclude that variables related to the constitution of the fleet are better in 
explaining the use of leasing by LCCs than performance or financial measures. 
4.4. Characteristics of leasing in low-cost carriers 
Still in the area of aircraft leasing there are other statistics that this 
paper covers and that are important on the analysis of the LCC industry. 
A crucial statistic is the one that presents the average of leased 
airplanes from the 125 LCCs existing in the study: leased aircraft represent 
                                                          
1 Many authors reviewed in the Chapter 2 on this issue suggest numerous other 
variables in this regression. Yan (2006) regress the debt ratio against the use of leasing and 
market-to-book ratio, employment, no-dividend, marginal tax rate, abnormal earnings, 
operating income, total assets and PPE; Deloof, Lagaert, and Verschueren (2007) add 
profitability, variability, log of total assets, growth, current assets and financial assets to the 
use of leasing; Beattie, Goodacre, and Thomson (2000): expected growth, liquidity, size, tax 
rate, profitability, total asset growth and fixed asset proportion; and Erickson and Trevino 
(1994): profitability, marginal tax rate, non-debt tax shields, earnings volatility and probability 
of financial distress. The only paper that just uses debt ratio against use of leasing is Marston 
and Harris (1988). For data availability and time constraint we are restricting ourselves to the 


























48.8% of the total fleet concerning LCCs. This figure is close to half of the fleet 
which attests the importance of leasing nowadays. 
We aim to compare this result with the aviation sector’s average. 
Ascend, a leading provider of expert advisory and valuations services to the 
global aviation industry, provides the current average of leased aircraft from 
every airline in the world. The advisory service estimates it to be 39%, meaning 
that LCCs make a more intensive use of leasing as a way of financing aircraft. 
This disparity of about 10% in aircraft leasing penetration rates shows that 
there is a key difference in the business strategies between LCCs and FSCs. 
Figure 1 gives a regional comparison on this statistic. Again, Ascend 
was the source for the global industry data, which is going to be compared to 
our results. Concerning LCCs only, we observe lease rates above 50% in South 
America (the leading region), Asia Pacific and Africa. North America, on the 
other hand, registers the lowest percentage. Interestingly enough, North 
America maintains the lowest lease rate when we refer to all the airlines, while 
South America also continues to be the leading region. This shows the 
different relevance that managers give to aircraft leasing in the two 
hemispheres of the continent. Europe registers values close to 50% in both 
indices. 













From all the 2,114 leased aircraft by LCCs, around two thirds are newly 
manufactured when they join the airlines’ fleet, more precisely 67%. (See 
Appendix IX) In this statistic there is a trend indicating that bigger airlines, 
due to their higher standards and financial capabilities, lease a higher 
proportion of new airplanes than the others. In the data we can find both 
single and mixed strategies, i.e., airlines that opt to lease only new aircraft, 
only used ones, or a mix between both. This relatively high percentage shows 
one of the biggest advantages of leasing over aircraft purchasing which is the 
possibility of obtaining better aircraft, improving the general airline quality. 
This paper also provides findings about the different types of leases in 
LCCs. We observe that operating lease is more prevalent than finance lease. 
(See Appendix X) Taking into account the available information provided in 
annual reports, operating leases represent 85% of all the leased aircraft, while 
finance lease account for the remaining 15%. This is good for LCC as their 
airplanes perform higher rates of take-off and landing, which is extremely 
demanding for the equipment. In the case of operating leasing, most of the 
times the lessee will not keep the over-used aircraft at the end of the contract, 
returning it to the lessor, which will receive equipment with a real residual 
value likely to be shorter than the accounting one. Besides no residual value 
risk there are other benefits for the lessee when choosing for operating leasing, 
such as, enhanced flexibility for the introduction of new routes or aircraft, 
lower financial outlay requirements, and naturally, the off-balance sheet 
financing entry. 
In order to assess the exact relevance of financing through leasing in 
the airlines’ financial structure, another variable needs to be calculated. This 
way, a comparison was made between future lease commitments and other 
debt commitments. (See Appendix XI) Mention that the lease commitments 
refer to both operating and finance leases, including also spare engines and 
simulators leasing. The remaining debt commitments are all the debt 
obligations net of leasing. The average ratio achieved was 79.6%. This means 
that future lease commitments are smaller than other debt, but this difference 
is not very substantial. The variance in this variable is considerable, since 
there are airlines showing a ratio as little as 5.4% and others with as much as 
326.4%. It is important to observe that this statistic allows us to comprehend 




Lease rates applied by lessors depend on the aircraft type, age and 
specification, type of lease, lease term, interest rates, tax liabilities, credit 
quality of the lessee, value of the aircraft at lease inception and forecasted 
residual value at lease termination. Very often airlines make their orders in 
packages, either when they purchase or lease aircraft. As carriers order a large 
number of aircraft, they get significant volume discounts, representing a great 
business opportunity that LCCs are taking advantage from. 
From the information available in the LCCs’ annual reports, we observe 
that, in most of the cases, airlines opt for floating interest rates when they 
make finance lease contracts with the lessors. These obligations bear interest 
partly at a variable rate, linked to LIBOR which is the most commonly used 
interest rate, and partly at a spread (risk premium). 
The biggest proportion of lease terms varies between 5 and 12 years. 
Some examples of lease contract durations in LCCs are given by Allegiant (9 to 
11 years), Azul (5 to 12), easyJet (5 to 10), Norwegian (3 to 12), Ryanair (7 to 
13) and Tigerair (6 to 12). In many cases, carriers have the option to extend 
the lease contracts. 
4.5. Discussion on the evolution of aircraft leasing 
This section intends to give an overview of the aircraft leasing market, 
its evolution as well as projections for the future. 
Firstly, we will look from a lessors’ perspective. The industry of aircraft 
leasing is clearly dominated by two lessors. They are GECAS (General Electric 
Capital Aviation Services) and ILFC (International Lease Finance Corporation). 
Table 8 presents the 20 largest lessors as measured by total fleet value. 
Recently, a number of companies in the emerging markets of Asia 
Pacific and Middle East have recently expanded into aircraft leasing. The most 
are remarkable is the growth of Chinese regional banks, like BOC, CDB and 
ICBC. But, despite the recent activity, leasing market remains fragmented and 
a large difference continues to exist between the portfolio sizes of the two 




Table 8: Top 20 lessors 
 
Lessors have seized on the opportunity of the big delivery bulge, using 
the relative strength of their balance sheets to move from just placing their 
own orders with Airbus and Boeing – and picking up aircraft in ones and twos 
– to much larger transactions that have made the lessors central to airlines' 
growth and survival (Cameron, 2013). In 2013 and 2014, Ascend expects 
aircraft leasing companies to purchase around 1,400 aircraft at a total value of 
approximately $80bn. 
Ascend has developed the Aircraft Investment Index (AAII) specifically to 
benchmark the risks and rewards of aircraft leasing investments against those 
of other industries. The index suggests that on a risk reward basis, investment 
in aircraft has outperformed other asset classes, including shipping and 
precious metals. 
As mentioned before, the current overall leasing penetration rate is 




operating leases account for the biggest proportion within aircraft leasing, 
representing 34% of the total aircraft population. 
Figure 2: Evolution of leasing penetration 
 
When we take a look at the evolution of use of leasing, displayed in 
Figure 2, we observe a notorious growth since 1996, the first year represented 
in the graph. Back then, leasing penetration rate was only 18%, meaning that, 
until today, the rate more than doubled. It represents a compounded annual 
growth rate of 8.5%, compared to fleet growth of 3.3% over the same period. 
Moreover, if we go back to the early 1980s, the growth becomes even more 
impressive as the leasing rate was only 2%. 
However, since the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008, leasing 
penetration rate remained at the level of 38-39%, putting a break to the 
continuous growth that had begun in 1997. Therefore leasing seems to be 
related to the state of the market. During the recent years of bear market the 
leasing rate remained stable after an 11-year growth. This analysis confirms 
Mancilla’s (2010) findings, which show lower demand for leasing during 
market downturns. If this correlation holds, the leasing rate will again rise 
when the bull market begins. 
This optimistic view is shared by Ascend and Boeing Capital, which 
forecast that leasing will represent about half of worldwide fleet by 2020. 




regarding the future of airplane leasing, forecasting a cumulative annual 
growth rate of 5.6% until 2021. 
Good projections for leasing growth come from two perspectives. 
Besides the already mentioned forecasts for leasing penetration rates, the 
global market will grow in absolute terms. Airbus and Boeing, the two major 
aircraft manufacturers, expect the global fleet to more than double during the 
next 20 years, as demonstrated in Figure 3. These forecasts demonstrate the 
impressive growing opportunities for leasing companies as the aviation market 
seem to become stronger and stronger. 
Figure 3: Projected Commercial Aircraft Growth 
 
Nevertheless, there are relevant issues that lessors are facing. These 
companies face challenges to finance aircraft with record backlogs and 
liquidity drying up. For instance, according to Ascend, backlog was 286 
airplanes for GECAS and 225 for ILFC at the end of 2012. On the other hand, 
lessors witness a decrease on the demand of older aircraft as Airbus and 
Boeing launch new types of airplanes. Airlines prefer newer aircraft and 
scrapping age has been decreasing (Shaw-Smith, 2012). Furthermore, 
developing countries are a main second-hand market for mid-aged aircraft, 







CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
This paper joins two major forces in the airline industry: LCCs and 
aircraft leasing. From one side, we deal with the sector of LCCs, which account 
for around 26% of global seat capacity nowadays, against only 8% in 2001. 
Moreover, the leaders as measured by carried passengers in both domestic 
and international travel are LCCs, Southwest and Ryanair respectively. From 
another side, aircraft leasing, whose share of the global fleet is 39% nowadays, 
while it used to be 23% in 2001. 
Aircraft leasing is a key financing instrument for airlines. The 
advantages of leasing instead of purchasing are many and quite relevant. It 
demands much lower capital requirements than a purchase does; it gives 
higher flexibility to adapt the fleet to market demand; it allows the airlines to 
generate cash flows from asset exploitation and thus being able to afford lease 
payments; unlike a loan, lease payments are constant; it gives the possibility 
for airlines to get younger and better aircraft; and finally, it provides off-
balance sheet financing (operating leases only). 
We found that aircraft leasing is negative correlated to the average fleet 
age, with high statistical significance, confirming Gavazza (2010) and the 
hypothesis created. This means that leasing is the option used for those 
airlines that want to renew their fleet. We also discovered that aircraft leasing 
works as a salvation for smaller airlines. As they do not have sufficient cash 
flows to afford purchasing, leasing comes as the best alternative for these 
airlines to keep operating. 
Though with no statistical significance, results hint at LCCs with better 
on-time performance show higher profit margin and consequently lower use of 
leasing. Furthermore, it was found a negative correlation between use of 
leasing and debt ratio, but the lack of statistical evidence does not allow us to 
confirm the substitutability between them. 
Regression analysis showed that fleet size, average fleet age, on-time 
performance and profit margin have negative effects on use of leasing by an 
LCC. The best variables to explain use of leasing are use fleet size and average 
fleet age, being the latter the most statistically significant. It shows that 




of leasing by LCCs than performance or financial measures. Therefore, further 
research can be done in this topic in order to determine models that are able 
to explain use of leasing by LCCs better. 
Aircraft leasing is more prevalent in LCCs than FSCs. The difference 
between 39% for LCCs and about 49% for the global industry shows that LCCs 
are the main customers concerning aircraft leasing, proving that leasing takes 
indeed a relevant position in the LCCs’ strategy. We estimate that lease 
commitments represent around 80% of the size of other debt commitments. 
They are predominantly operating lease agreements, whose term varies mainly 
between 5 and 12 years. In addition, about two thirds of the airplanes by LCCs 
are newly-manufactured, which represents a major advantage of leasing that 
is the possibility of having a younger fleet. 
Leasing penetration rate seems to fluctuate according to the economic 
conditions. Between 2008 and 2013, the leasing rate remained stable, 
coinciding with the bear market. Projections from Ascend and Boeing Capital 
for the leasing rate are that it will increase, and by 2020 about half of the 
global fleet is expected to be leased. Besides, the global fleet will rise to more 
than double over the next 20 years. Therefore, leasing companies have 
enormous growing opportunities. However, these companies are facing serious 
problems, such as record backlogs and lower demand for older aircraft. 
More and more lessors are coming from the regions of Asia Pacific and 
Middle East. A suggestion of further research would be to perform a detailed 
study on these new sources of financing, namely the growth of Islamic 
banking and the extraordinary rise of regional banks in Asia Pacific into 
aviation market (especially Chinese banks, like BOC, CDB and ICBC). The aim 
would be to assess how they are changing the leasing market patterns, mainly 









































































































Table with use of leasing, fleet size, average fleet age and on-time 
performance 
Airline Use of leasing Fleet size Average fleet age On-time performance 
Air Arabia 32% 28 3 81% 
Air Arabia Egypt 100% 1 6,5 n/a 
Air Arabia Maroc 50% 4 3,8 68% 
Air Busan 10% 10 14,5 90% 
Air Do 57% 14 14,7 88% 
Air One  100% 10 5,6 81% 
Air Transat 65% 20 17,2 67% 
AirAsia 0% 67 4,8 74% 
AirAsia X 24% 17 6,6 68% 
AirAsia Zest 58% 12 11,4 45% 
airBaltic 88% 26 13 87% 
AirBlue 38% 8 8,8 n/a 
AirTran Airways 81% 124 9,4 73% 
Allegiant Air 3% 71 22,1 70% 
Amaszonas 0% 4 16,1 n/a 
Anadolu Jet 18% 28 8,5 86% 
Arkia 0% 8 12,6 66% 
Astra Airlines 0% 3 21 n/a 
Azul Brazilian Airlines 56% 138 5,3 83% 
Belle Air 71% 7 11,2 72% 
Belle Air Europe 100% 2 7,3 50% 
Blue Air 33% 6 21,6 75% 
Blu-Express 80% 5 19,6 52% 
Cebu Pacific Air 85% 46 4,2 69% 
Citilink 72% 29 6,7 n/a 
City Airways 0% 4 22 n/a 
Corendon 75% 8 14,1 n/a 
Corendon Dutch Airlines 100% 3 10 n/a 
Dana Air 0% 1 22,8 n/a 
Dragonair 63% 41 11,6 50% 
Eastar Jet 44% 9 12 76% 
Easyfly 0% 3 18 n/a 
easyJet 35% 195 5,1 89% 
easyJet Switzerland 64% 22 6,4 n/a 
Fastjet 100% 3 12,6 n/a 
Firefly 7% 14 5 72% 
Fly 540 40% 10 23,1 n/a 
Flybe 91% 69 6,9 84% 
Flybe Finland 100% 28 5,1 84% 
Flydubai 38% 32 2,3 66% 




Germanwings 31% 39 8,1 89% 
GoAir 82% 17 3,2 68% 
GOL 100% 136 7 84% 
Golden Myanmar 100% 2 11,2 n/a 
Helvetic Airways 14% 7 19,6 81% 
Iberia Express 13% 16 9,8 93% 
IndiGo 51% 72 2,4 87% 
Indonesia AirAsia 39% 28 3,6 61% 
Interjet 49% 41 6,4 73% 
Intersky 0% 6 11,7 87% 
Israir 0% 4 2,9 78% 
JAL Express 64% 42 3,8 88% 
Jazeera Airways 25% 8 4,7 92% 
Jeju Air 77% 13 12,7 87% 
Jet2 10% 50 22,2 82% 
Jetairfly 76% 21 5,5 86% 
JetBlue Airways 34% 191 8 67% 
JetKonnect 88% 17 6,8 79% 
Jetstar Airways 80% 74 5,3 75% 
Jetstar Asia Airways 58% 19 3,3 88% 
Jetstar Japan 44% 18 0,8 85% 
Jetstar Pacific 80% 5 8,7 n/a 
Jin Air 80% 10 13,2 77% 
Juneyao Airlines 55% 33 3,1 42% 
Kulula.com 50% 10 9,8 89% 
Lion Air 15% 95 5 68% 
Lucky Air 44% 18 6,3 54% 
Magnicharters 14% 7 25,7 n/a 
Malindo Air 0% 9 0,4 n/a 
Mango 89% 9 13 n/a 
Meridiana 59% 27 17,6 82% 
Mihin Lanka 100% 3 8,2 74% 
Monarch Airlines 46% 39 13,1 72% 
Nas Air 88% 24 7 66% 
NIKI 82% 22 4,2 84% 
Nok Air 100% 18 12,2 90% 
Nok Mini 100% 6 15,6 n/a 
Norwegian Air Shuttle 56% 78 5 91% 
Nouvelair 23% 13 12,8 n/a 
Onur Air 92% 25 16 73% 
Orient Thai Airlines 14% 21 23,1 66% 
PAL Airlines 40% 5 25,1 n/a 
PAL Express 57% 21 6,1 59% 
Peach 100% 10 1,1 77% 
Pegasus 29% 45 4,1 85% 




Philippines AirAsia 100% 2 2,1 75% 
PIA 30% 30 16,4 43% 
RAK Airways 100% 2 7,1 n/a 
Ryanair 28% 301 5,2 n/a 
Scoot 0% 6 15,9 71% 
Sky Airline 100% 17 11,8 78% 
Skymark Airlines 100% 33 3,3 73% 
SmartWings 86% 7 9,3 87% 
Solaseed Air 100% 13 7,3 77% 
Southwest Airlines 16% 575 11,2 74% 
SpiceJet 63% 57 4,2 72% 
Spirit Airlines 100% 52 5,2 57% 
Spring Airlines 63% 38 3,9 42% 
Star Peru 9% 11 24,7 67% 
Sun Country Airlines 100% 17 11,6 74% 
SunExpress 65% 43 8,5 90% 
Sunwing Airlines 87% 15 6,9 56% 
Thai AirAsia 50% 32 3,1 92% 
Tigerair 58% 24 2,7 85% 
Tigerair Australia 64% 11 5,3 66% 
Tigerair Mandala 100% 9 1,1 69% 
Tigerair Philippines 100% 5 2,7 66% 
Transavia 40% 35 8,7 88% 
Transavia France 100% 11 6,9 70% 
TUIfly 24% 33 8,8 93% 
T'Way Air 83% 6 10,8 83% 
United Airways 64% 11 20,3 69% 
VietJet Air 100% 10 3,5 n/a 
Virgin America 77% 53 4,7 73% 
VivaAerobus 55% 22 22,3 86% 
VivaColombia 80% 5 12,2 n/a 
Volaris 50% 44 4,2 87% 
Volotea 100% 15 9,6 74% 
Vueling 100% 70 7,8 78% 
Westjet 43% 103 7,2 73% 
Wizz Air 44% 41 4,2 89% 
Wizz Air Ukraine 50% 4 2,9 90% 










Table with use of leasing, fleet size, average fleet age, on-time 
performance, profit margin and debt ratio 
Airline Use of leasing Total fleet Average fleet age On-time performance Profit Margin Debt ratio 
Air Arabia* 36% 33 3,2 79% 14,4% 32,4% 
Air Transat 65% 20 17,2 67% -0,4% 68,5% 
AirAsia* 23% 146 4,4 75% 37,0% 64,8% 
airBaltic 88% 26 13 87% -8,3% n/a 
Allegiant Air 3% 71 22,1 70% 8,6% 49,7% 
Azul Brazilian Airlines 56% 138 5,3 83% -7,0% 92,6% 
Cebu Pacific Air 85% 46 4,2 69% 9,4% 63,9% 
easyJet* 38% 217 5,2 89% 9,3% 54,3% 
Fastjet* 54% 13 20,7 n/a -265,6% 63,7% 
Flybe* 94% 97 6,4 84% -6,8% 88,1% 
GOL 100% 136 7 84% -18,7% 91,9% 
Jazeera Airways 25% 8 4,7 92% 14,4% 87,9% 
Jet2 10% 50 22,2 82% 3,6% 75,0% 
JetBlue Airways 34% 191 8 67% 2,6% 73,3% 
Jetstar* 76% 97 4,5 79% 5,6% n/a 
Jin Air 80% 10 13,2 77% 4,0% 81,0% 
Meridiana 59% 27 17,6 82% -32,8% 131,2% 
Monarch Airlines 46% 39 13,1 72% -3,2% 132,8% 
Nok Air* 100% 24 13,1 90% 6,1% 60,6% 
Norwegian Air Shuttle 56% 78 5 91% 3,4% 79,9% 
PIA 30% 30 16,4 43% -25,9% 141,5% 
Ryanair 28% 301 5,2 n/a 11,7% 63,4% 
Skymark Airlines 100% 33 3,3 73% 4,5% 36,9% 
Southwest Airlines* 14% 699 10,9 74% 2,5% 62,4% 
SpiceJet 63% 57 4,2 72% -3,3% 107,3% 
Spirit Airlines 100% 52 5,2 57% 8,2% 36,7% 
Tigerair* 71% 49 3 76% 5,2% 81,1% 
Transavia France 100% 11 6,9 70% 0,0% 74,6% 
United Airways 64% 11 20,3 69% 13,7% 37,0% 
Virgin America 77% 53 4,7 73% -10,9% n/a 
Volaris 50% 44 4,2 87% 4,6% 51,1% 
Vueling 100% 70 7,8 78% 2,6% 65,3% 
Westjet 43% 103 7,2 73% 7,1% 60,7% 









Table with new leased aircraft 
Airline Leased aircraft New leased aircraft 
Air Arabia 9 100% 
Air Arabia Egypt 1 0% 
Air Arabia Maroc 2 100% 
Air Busan 1 0% 
Air Do 8 0% 
Air One  10 80% 
Air Transat 13 15% 
AirAsia 0 - 
AirAsia X 4 0% 
AirAsia Zest 7 14% 
AirBaltic 23 52% 
AirBlue 3 0% 
AirTran Airways 100 72% 
Allegiant Air 2 0% 
Amaszonas 0 - 
Anadolu Jet 5 0% 
Arkia 0 - 
Astra Airlines 0 - 
Azul Brazilian Airlines 77 69% 
Belle Air 5 0% 
Belle Air Europe 2 0% 
Blue Air 2 0% 
Blu-Express 4 0% 
Cebu Pacific Air 39 100% 
Citilink 21 67% 
City Airways 0 - 
Corendon 6 0% 
Corendon Dutch Airlines 3 0% 
Dana Air 0 - 
Dragonair 26 69% 
Eastar Jet 4 0% 
Easyfly 0 - 
easyJet 69 100% 
easyJet Switzerland 14 36% 
Fastjet 3 0% 
Firefly 1 0% 
Fly 540 4 0% 
Flybe 63 100% 
Flybe Finland 28 50% 
Flydubai 12 100% 
Frontier Airlines 44 82% 




GoAir 14 100% 
GOL 136 72% 
Golden Myanmar 2 0% 
Helvetic Airways 1 0% 
Iberia Express 2 50% 
IndiGo 37 78% 
Indonesia AirAsia 11 73% 
Interjet 20 15% 
Intersky 0 - 
Israir 0 - 
JAL Express 27 96% 
Jazeera Airways 2 100% 
Jeju Air 10 0% 
Jet2 5 0% 
Jetairfly 16 63% 
JetBlue Airways 64 100% 
JetKonnect 15 13% 
Jetstar Airways 59 90% 
Jetstar Asia Airways 11 82% 
Jetstar Japan 8 100% 
Jetstar Pacific 4 25% 
Jin Air 8 0% 
Juneyao Airlines 18 100% 
Kulula.com 5 0% 
Lion Air 14 64% 
Lucky Air 8 0% 
Magnicharters 1 0% 
Malindo Air 0 - 
Mango 8 0% 
Meridiana 16 0% 
Mihin Lanka 3 0% 
Monarch Airlines 18 28% 
Nas Air 21 52% 
NIKI 18 100% 
Nok Air 18 6% 
Nok Mini 6 0% 
Norwegian Air Shuttle 44 70% 
Nouvelair 3 67% 
Onur Air 23 0% 
Orient Thai Airlines 3 0% 
PAL Airlines 2 0% 
PAL Express 12 0% 
Peach 10 100% 
Pegasus 13 46% 
Peruvian Airlines 5 0% 




PIA 9 100% 
RAK Airways 2 0% 
Ryanair 85 100% 
Scoot 0 - 
Sky Airline 17 0% 
Skymark Airlines 33 100% 
SmartWings 6 0% 
Solaseed Air 13 62% 
Southwest Airlines 91 77% 
SpiceJet 36 86% 
Spirit Airlines 52 100% 
Spring Airlines 24 79% 
Star Peru 1 0% 
Sun Country Airlines 17 29% 
SunExpress 28 14% 
Sunwing Airlines 13 23% 
Thai AirAsia 16 100% 
Tigerair 14 100% 
Tigerair Australia 7 100% 
Tigerair Mandala 9 100% 
Tigerair Philippines 5 0% 
Transavia 14 86% 
Transavia France 11 73% 
TUIfly 8 75% 
T'Way Air 5 20% 
United Airways 7 0% 
VietJet Air 10 20% 
Virgin America 41 90% 
VivaAerobus 12 0% 
VivaColombia 4 0% 
Volaris 22 77% 
Volotea 15 0% 
Vueling 70 56% 
Westjet 44 100% 
Wizz Air 18 83% 
Wizz Air Ukraine 2 100% 












Table with operating and finance leases 
Airline Operating Finance 
Air Arabia* 3 12 
Azul Brazilian Airlines 71 4 
Cebu Pacific Air 11 27 
Dragonair 26 1 
easyJet* 72 11 
Flybe* 88 2 
GOL 96 45 
Jet2 4 0 
JetBlue Airways 60 4 
Meridiana 25 1 
Norwegian Air Shuttle 40 0 
PIA 1 8 
Ryanair 59 30 
Southwest Airlines* 187 2 
Spirit Airlines 45 0 
Tigerair* 22 7 
United Airways 0 7 
Vueling 53 0 
Westjet 44 0 
 
85% 15% 

















Table with lease commitments/other debt commitments 
Airline Lease/other debt 
Air Arabia* 139,6% 
Air Transat 45,4% 
AirAsia* 28,4% 
Allegiant Air 31,9% 
Azul Brazilian Airlines 90,3% 






JetBlue Airways 19,9% 
Meridiana 30,1% 
Monarch Airlines 9,1% 
Norwegian Air Shuttle 158,9% 
PIA 23,4% 
Ryanair 26,6% 
Southwest Airlines* 38,4% 
SpiceJet 109,7% 
Spirit Airlines 326,4% 
Tigerair* 88,9% 
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